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ABSTRACT:  The creation of the World Trade Organization in 1994 has left open the question of 
whether we can identify a theory of its legal system. A theory should help us to better 
understand what WTO law is as well as what it should be. This article posits the idea that a 
theory can be identified if we conceive of the WTO Agreement as protecting expectations about 
trade, facilitating adjustment to realities encountered in trade, and promoting interdependence 
between economic operators. Each of these purposes is implemented under the WTO 
Agreement by a specific instrument. In the case of expectations it is collective obligations, in 
the case of realities it is individual rights, and in the case of interdependence it is a combination 
of the foregoing two, a lex specialis. The interaction is emblematic of a deeper division within 
the treaty between opposing modes of law. 
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A THEORY OF WTO LAW 
 
By Chios Carmody1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. WHY A THEORY? 
III. A THEORY OF WTO LAW 
 A. Protecting Expectations: A Law of Obligations 
 B. Facilitating Adjustment: A Law of Rights 





The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO 
Agreement)2 is one of the keystones of international law today, yet more than a decade 
after its entry into force we continue to lack a coherent theory for it. In short, why is the 
treaty as it is? 
 
To put this question in context, it is useful to remember that we have a generally 
accepted economic theory of the WTO Agreement based on the exchange of trade 
concessions.3 We also have a generally accepted political theory of the WTO 
Agreement based upon the Kantian idea of a liberal peace.4 Nevertheless, we continue 
to lack a legal theory of the WTO Agreement, by which I mean a system of ideas to 
explain the treaty as a matter of law and justice.5 The prevailing situation has led 
Thomas Cottier, Matthias Oesch and Thomas Fischer to observe recently that “the 
absence of a longstanding legal theory or tradition of international trade regulation 
explains why even basic questions are still in the open.”6 
                                                 
1 Associate Professor and Canadian Director, Canada-United States Law Institute, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, 
London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7, email: ccarmody@uwo.ca. I would like to thank Jeffery Dunoff for suggesting the particular 
angle to this article and Janice Ho and Ryan Brown for their research assistance. 
2 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
3 Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 3nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2005) at 2-3, 37. For 
an econometric approach see Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, “An Economic Theory of GATT”, NBER Working Paper No. 6049 
(May 1997). 
4 Kant did not make the argument that democracies will not fight, only that they are not disposed to fight each other. Later theorists 
recognized the same tendency among countries that conduct trade with each other. See Padideh Ala’i et al. (eds), Trade as Guarantor 
of Peace, Liberty and Security? Critical, Historical and Empirical Perspectives (Washington: American Society of International Law, 
2006) vii.  
5 Law is defined as “”the aggregate of legislation, judicial precedents, and accepted legal principles” Bryan Gardner (ed.), Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 8th ed. (St. Paul: Thomson/West, 2004) 900; justice is defined as “giving each their due”, ibid., 881.  
6 Thomas Cottier et al., International Trade Regulation: Law and Policy in the WTO, the European Union and Switzerland (London: 
Cameron May, 2005) 33, 47. They observe additionally that “Theoretical analysis of the exact contents and confines of the core legal 
principles governing the current multilateral trading system … are in full swing in dialogue with the case law and far from settled, 
despite the fact that these concepts have been in existence for a very long time. An academic body of legal theory of trade regulation is 
only beginning to be built, dealing with basic structures, institutions and regulatory approaches.” Work of other commentators is 
hardly more clear on the subject of an underlying theory. For instance, John Jackson has described the WTO Agreement as “a very 
complex mix of economic and governmental policies, political constraints, and above all an intricate set of constraints imposed by a 
variety of “rules” or legal norms in a particular institutional setting.” John Jackson, The World Trading System, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1998) 339. In more recent work he has disclaimed the notion of a “grand theory” and focused more directly on “queries 
rather than theories”: see John Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) xi. For further attempts at theoretical development of GATT/WTO law see Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, “International Economic Theory and International Economic Law: On the Tasks of a Legal Theory of International 
Economic Order” in R. St. J. Macdonald and D.M. Johnston, eds, The Structure and Process of International Law (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1983) 227; Andrew Caplin & Karla Krishna, “Tariffs and the Most-Favoured Nation Clause: A Game Theoretical 
Approach”, 1 Seoul Journal of Economics (1988) 267; Carolyn Rhodes, Reciprocity, U.S. Trade Policy and the GATT Regime (Ithaca: 
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In other work I have pointed out that the WTO Agreement can be understood as aimed 
primarily at the protection of expectations concerning the trade-related behaviour of 
governments, but also, and secondarily, at facilitating adjustment to certain realities 
encountered in the course of trade. The interaction of these two purposes – one 
dominant, the other subordinate – achieves a third purpose over time, which is the 
promotion of interdependence among economic operators.7 
 
In this article I want to go on to examine how these each of these purposes is 
implemented by a distinct element. In the case of expectations it is collective 
obligations, in the case of realities it is individual rights, and in the case of 
interdependence it is a combination of the foregoing two, a ‘special law’ or lex 
specialis. The result is an ongoing tension, or dialectic, between WTO and domestic 
law. 
 
This identification is important because it helps us to get more directly at a theory of 
WTO law. One of the consequences of the prevailing theoretic vacuum is that WTO law 
has to be discussed in either highly specific or very general terms. There is very little 
in-between. 
 
Thus, there have been many articles on this or that WTO case, on the trend in a series of 
cases, or on particular WTO provisions.8 Likewise the treaty has been assessed from a 
variety of economic, political and international relations perspectives.9 Much of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cornell University Press, 1993); Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, “Towards a Positive Theory of the Most Favoured Nation 
Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System”, 16 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. (1996) 27; Petros Mavroidis, ““Like Products”: 
Some Thoughts at the Positive and Normative Levels” in Thomas Cottier & Petros Mavroidis (eds.), Regulatory Barriers and the 
Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000) 125; Meinhardt Hilf, Power, 
Rules and Principles: Which Orientation for WTO/GATT Law? 4 J.I.E.L. 111 (2001); Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “The 
Theory of Trade Agreements” in The Economics of the World Trading System (Cambridge; MIT Press, 2002); Darrel Moellendorf, 
“The World Trade Organization and Egalitarian Justice” in Christian Barry et al. (eds.), Global Institutions and Responsibilities: 
Achieving Global Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). Book-length treatments are also available: see Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Inequality 
and Justice: Towards a Liberal Theory of Just Trade (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2003); Raj Bhala, Trade, Development and 
Social Justice (Durham: North Carolina Academic Press, 2003). 
7 Chios Carmody, “WTO Obligations as Collective” 17:2 Eur. J. Int’l L. 419 (2006). 
8 For a sampling see Fabian Delcros, Le statut juridique de l’agriculture à l’OMC, 36 J.W.T. (2002) 353; Kym Anderson and Tim 
Josling (ed.), The WTO and Agriculture: Vol. 1 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004); Emily Rome, The Background, Requirements and 
Future of the GATT/WTO Preshipment Inspection Agreement, 7 Minn. J. Global Trade (1998) 469; Anuwarul Hoda, Tariff 
Negotiations and Renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2001); Moshe Hirsch, 
“International Trade Law, Political Economy and Rules of Origin”, 36 J.W.T. (2002) 171; Kyle Bagwell, Petros Mavroidis et al., “It’s a 
Question of Market Access”, 96 A.J.I.L. (2002) 56; Paul Beynon, “Community Mutual Recognition Agreements, Technical Barriers to 
Trade and the WTO’s Most Favoured Nation Principle”, 28 Env. L. Rev. (2003) 231; Stefano Inama, “Trade Preferences and the World 
Trade Organization’s Negotiations on Market Access”, 37 J.W.T. (2003) 959; Joel Trachtman, “The Domain of WTO Dispute 
Resolution”, 40 Harv. J. Int’l L. (1999) 333; Robert Hudec, “The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure”, 8 Minn. J. Global Trade  
(1999) 1; Georg C. Umbricht, “An ‘Amicus Curiae Brief’ on Amicus Curiae Briefs at the WTO”, 4 J.I.E.L. 773 (2001); Edwin 
Vermulst, “WTO Dispute Settlement with Respect to Trade Contingency Measures”, 35 J.W.T. (2001) 209; Joost Pauwelyn, “The Use 
of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement”, 51 I.C.L.Q. (2002) 325; Hunter R. Clark, “The WTO Banana Dispute and Its Implications for 
Trade Relations between the United States and the European Union”, 35 Cornell J. Int’l L. (2002) 291; Richard Cunningham, Dispute 
Settlement Through the Lens of “Free Flow of Trade”, 6 J.I.E.L. (2003) 155; Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute 
Resolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); John Jackson, “International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports”, 
98 A.J.I.L. (2004) 109; Federico Ortino and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2003 (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004); Hans Mahncke, “U.S. Steel Tariffs and the WTO Dispute Resolution Mechanism”, 17 
Leiden J. Int’l L. (2004) 615; Petros Mavroidis and Alan Sykes (ed.), The WTO and International Trade Law/Dispute Settlement 
(2005); Nicholas Perdikis and Robert Read (eds.), The WTO and the Regulation of International Trade Law (2005). 
9 See Robert Howse and Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy (Montreal: International Centre for Human 
Rights and Democratic Development, 2000); P.K. RAO, The World Trade Organization and the Environment (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2000); Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: the future of the World Trade Organization (Washington: 
American Enterprise Institute Press, 2001); Steven Shrybman, The World Trade Organization: A Citizen’s Guide (Halifax: James 
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work is insightful, but it has tended to obscure the framework on which the treaty is 
based: rights and obligations. Rights and obligations are the foundation of any system 
of law, including international law, and so it seems entirely appropriate to focus on their 
relationship under the WTO Agreement as a means of bringing the discussion at various 
levels together and discerning what the recurrent patterns of WTO law might be.10 
 
Attention to rights and obligations is promising for the development of a theory because 
references to “rights” and “obligations” appear frequently in WTO law and 
jurisprudence, but rarely, if ever, have they been subject to serious scrutiny.11 However, 
their arrangement, the contrapuntal stress they create, and the way they simultaneously 
“constrain and enable”12 state action, all afford us deeper insight into why things are as 
they are. 
 
My principal point in this article is that while we might consider the presumptive 
relationship between rights and obligations to be one of correspondence – that is, each 
right is matched by a single, offsetting obligation - two features operate to modify this 
traditional jural relationship in WTO law.13 First, the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
clause causes obligations owed under the treaty to become obligations owed to the 
entire WTO membership. This converts them into collective obligations. Second, the 
dynamic nature of trade-related behaviour works to change their tenor, being apparently 
bilateral in a few instances but absolute in most others. The modification reveals a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lormier, 2001); Gary P. Sampson (ed.), The Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance (Tokyo: UNU Press, 2001); 
Thomas Hockin, The American Nightmare: Politics and the fragile World Trade Organization (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003); Lori 
Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization?: a Comprehensive Guide to the WTO (New York: The New Press, 2004); 
Deborah Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy, Community (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Bradly J. Condon, Environmental Sovereignty and the WTO: trade sanctions and international law (Ardsley, 
Transnational Publishers, 2006); John Barton et al., The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law and Economics of the GATT and 
the WTO (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Rorden Wilkinson, The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade 
(London: Routledge, 2006); Roman Grynberg (ed.), WTO at the Margins: Small States and the Multilateral Trading System 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Math Noortman, Enforcing International Law: from Self-Help to Self-Contained 
Regimes (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2005). 
10 The correspondence of rights and obligations as a hallmark of international law has been recognized in many instances. It is implicit 
in the International Law Commission’s Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, which the U.N. General Assembly 
“commended to the continuing attention of [U.N.] Member States”, G.A. Res. 375 (IV) (6 Dec. 1949). It has also been pivotal in a 
number of disputes before the International Court of Justice: see Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
(Qatar v. Bahrain) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), [1994] I.C.J. Rep. 12 (discussing the fact that a document between the parties 
“was not a simple record of a meeting” but something which “enumerat[ed] the commitments to which the Parties have consented. 
They thus create rights and obligations in international law for the Parties.”  (emphasis added)). For a case where the absence of rights 
and obligations precluded the creation of an international agreement see Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 
93. 
11 See for instance United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R, p. 15 (10 
Feb. 1997) where the Appellate Body described the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing as composed of “carefully negotiated 
language” reflecting “a carefully drawn balance of rights and obligations of Members.”; see also Brazil – Export Financing 
Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 139 (2 Aug. 1999). A sign of the difficulty of assessing what the term means is the 
Appellate Body’s admission in Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R, para. 87 (13 Dec. 1999) that “[I]n these 
circumstances, we do not consider that the Panel has added to the rights or obligations of any Member of the WTO. Moreover, we 
have difficulty in envisaging circumstances in which a panel could add to the rights and obligations of a Member … if its conclusions 
reflected a correct interpretation and application of provisions…”. 
12 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 19, 31 (2000). 
13 The idea of a correspondence between rights and obligations was recognized by early philosophers but developed most insightfully 
by Wesley Hohfeld, who postulated that the term “right” may involve either a claim, privilege, power or an immunity. In Hohfeld’s 
view the same rights are offset by correlative duties, which may involve either a requirement, a constraint, a liability or a disability. 
See Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, As Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Essays (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1919). Also Wlliam A. Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights 43 (2004) (discussing Edmund Burke’s contribution to 
the idea of right-obligation correspondence). For further discussion of the right-obligation correlation see Philip Allott, Eunomia: New 
Order for a New World (Oxford: Oxford Univefrsity Press, 1990) 160ff [hereinafter Allott, Eunomia].  
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curious hybridism about WTO obligations in the sense that they do not fit completely 
into traditional categories of international legal obligation.14 Instead, they appear at 
times to straddle them.  
 
Consideration of rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement also reveals a 
number of other insights about WTO law. One is that the overarching nature of WTO 
obligations restricts the ambit of rights. Most rights under the WTO Agreement are 
highly conditioned. They do not possess the amplitude we normally expect of rights, a 
quality which probably accounts for perceptions about the relative intensity of WTO 
law.15 
 
Another insight pertains to the substantive divide at the heart of the WTO Agreement. 
WTO obligations are observed collectively whereas WTO rights are exercised 
individually. This promotes two competing visions of justice. Again, in other work I 
have pointed out that the principal type of justice under the WTO Agreement is 
distributive. In cases of a violation, justice operates to maintain the distribution of 
collective expectations, something which explains the habitual direction to wrongdoers 
under Art. 19.1 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to bring their 
laws “into conformity” with the WTO Agreement.16 In most instances conformity 
involves withdrawal or amendment of the offending measure, action which results in re-
establishment of the equal distribution of expectations. 
 
At the same time, a second type of justice is at work in WTO law and is corrective in 
the sense that it aims to repair harm done. The harm occurs because countries exercise 
their individual rights to take action that, strictly speaking, may disappoint 
expectations. For instance, the right to impose a safeguard or to levy an anti-dumping 
duty can arise in WTO law where imports cause the requisite degree of injury and 
where certain procedural requirements are fulfilled. Here it is easier to see the task of 
justice being to correct injury to specific interests. This is apparent in the possibility of 
negotiating temporary compensation for identified violations of WTO law under DSU 
Art. 22.2, but it is also evident elsewhere.17 
                                                 
14 The classification of treaty obligations in international law generally follows the scheme proposed by Gerald Fitzmaurice in the 
1950s. Fitzmaurice identified treaties as either bilateral or multilateral, and further divided multilateral treaties into reciprocal, 
interdependent or integral categories depending on the consequences arising from their breach. Bilateral treaties can be suspended or 
terminated by either party since they involve a simple exchange of obligations. Subsequent inconsistent treaties are valid. The same 
generally holds for multilateral treaties of a bilateral type, which are said to be ‘reciprocal’. By comparison, multilateral 
interdependent treaties can be suspended or terminated by any party because they involve “a mutual interchange of benefits between 
the parties, with rights and obligations for each.”14 Subsequent inconsistent treaties are void. Finally, multilateral treaties of an integral 
type cannot be suspended or terminated since “the force of the obligation is self-existent, absolute and inherent for each party”. 
Subsequent inconsistent treaties are also void. See, in particular, Gerald Fitzmaurice, “Third Report on the Law of Treaties”, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/115, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, pp. 20, 27 and 28 (1958). 
15 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, “Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court”” in Federico Ortino and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
(eds.), The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2003 499, 522-23 (2004). 
16 See DSU Art. 19.1: “Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it 
shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.” 
17 “If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance … such 
Member shall, if so requested, and no later than the expiry of the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with any party 
having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation.” As of mid-2008 
compensation had only been negotiated in one case under the WTO DSU, United States – Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, 
WT/DS160/R (15 June 2000). For commentary see Bernard O’Connor & Margareta Djordjevic, “Practical Aspects of Monetary 
Compensation: The U.S. Copyright Case” 8:1 J. Int’l Econ. L. 127 (2005). See also Art. 7.8 of the WTO Subsidies Agreement (“the 
Member granting or maintaining such subsidy shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or shall withdraw the 
subsidy.”). This provision was at issue in Australia – Subsidies provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather (21.5), 
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Over time the interaction of rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement produces 
a regime of law that can be described as a lex specialis. The combination is a “special 
law” because in many instances it does not conform to the normal consequences of state 
responsibility, and justice in this mode is transformative because it does not seek to 
distribute expectations or correct harm exclusively, but rather to resolve conflicts 
between national interests in a manner that develops and strengthens relationships 
among those involved.18 
 
Evidence of transformative justice is apparent in outcomes under the WTO Agreement. 
These outcomes may indicate continuing dissatisfaction with the status quo, as in the 
case of the Hormones dispute.19 Alternately, they may involve a limited form of accord 
– a “pool of consensus” - that serves as a basis for broader agreement, as in Sri Lanka 
and the EC’s effort to establish a new standard for chemical residues in cinnamon.20 
Finally, the outcome may take the form of a full-blown consensus among the 
membership, as in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.21  
 
What each of these outcomes has in common is active or passive agreement. The 
agreement is not singular or static, but rather in constant flux. The WTO Appellate 
Body demonstrated indirect awareness of this idea in U.S. – Shrimp when it observed 
                                                                                                                                                 
WT/DS126/RW (21 January 2000). 
18 “Transformative justice must be driven by the needs of participants. Decisions on how to resolve the conflict ought to be based on a 
consensus. By consensus, we mean an agreement on how to move forward that is acceptable to all parties. A consensus cannot be 
imposed. Nor is a consensus just a middle ground position. The goal will be to find common ground on which a mutually acceptable 
resolution can be established. This is the power of transformative justice: the possibility of using the substance of a conflict as a means 
of exploring options and establishing responses that are not only acceptable to all parties but develop and strengthen relationships 
among those involved.” Law Commission of Canada, From Restorative Justice to Transformative Justice: Discussion Paper, Law 
Commission of Canada Catalogue No. JL2-6/1999 (1999). Philip Allott speaks of international economic law and administration as 
“socially transformatory law”: Philip Allott, The Health of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 36, 99 
[hereinafter Allott, Health]. Andrew Robinson and Simon Tormey, “‘Horizontals’, ‘Verticals’ and the Conflicting Logics of 
Transformative Politics” in Philip Hayden and Chamsy el-Ojeili (eds), Confronting Globalization: Humanity, Justice and the Renewal 
of Politics (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 208. Some idea of the successive articulation of GATT/WTO law in 
dispute settlement and then negotiation (and potentially back again) is given by John M. Weekes, The External Dynamics of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding: Its Impact on Trade Relations and Trade Negotiations – An Initial Analysis (2004) (on file with 
author). See also generally Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Trade Wars and Trade Talks, 103:4 J. Pol. Econ. (1995) 675; Steven 
Woolcock (ed.), Multilateralism in Neutral: The Interaction between Levels of Rulemaking in International Trade and Investment 
(2006). 
19 In 1996 the United States and Canada challenged a ban by the EC on imports of hormone-treated meat and meat products. The 
challenge centered on the alleged failure of the EC to conduct a risk assessment prior to instituting the ban. The U.S. and Canadian 
positions were accepted by a WTO panel and the Appellate Body, and in July 1999 both the United States and Canada were authorized 
to retaliate against the ban. Since the imposition of retaliation the EC has continued to keep its market closed to imports of hormone-
treated meat, but has allegedly removed the fact of WTO–inconsistency by implementing new measures and invoking a precautionary 
approach to regulation. This resulted in a challenge by the EC in November 2004 to the continuing U.S. and Canadian retaliation. A 
panel examining the matter agreed with the EC position, but a parallel decision rendered at the same time found that EC restrictions on 
hormone-treated meat are illegal in WTO law. In late May 2008 the EC appealed the decisions concerning its regulatory scheme and 
the continuing suspensions. See “EU Appeals WTO Hormone Ban Decision, Seeks Clarity on Retaliation”, Inside U.S. Trade (May 30, 
2008). 
20 A WTO press release noted that the EC maintained a ban on sulphur dioxide in cinnamon, even though it allowed minimal levels in 
other spices. “The issue arose partly because Codex Alimentarius, the WHO-FAO body where countries negotiate standards for food 
safety, did not have a standard for SO2 residues in cinnamon. In July [2006], Codex approved a new standard … and Sri Lanka praised 
the EU for “excellent cooperation” in finding a solution, partly through administrative means. In February [2006] the EU offered to 
help Sri Lanka apply for approval for a standard and to seek support from the European Parliament and the [EU] member states.”  See 
Sri Lankan cinnamon’s future brightens, SPS Committee told (Oct. 11-12, 2006), available at www.wto.org; see also Sulphur Dioxide 
in Cinnamon, G/SPS/GEN/716 (July 25, 2006). 
21 See WTO Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (20 Nov. 2001) and also Decision on the Implementation 
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (2 Sept. 2003). For a comprehensive 
account of the development of these documents see Haochen Sun, The Road to Doha and Beyond: Some Reflections on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 123 (Feb. 2004). 
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that “[t]he location of the line of equilibrium is not fixed and unchanging; the line 
moves as the kind and shape of the measures at stake vary and the facts making up 
specific cases differ.”22 
 
While the Appellate Body’s statement in Shrimp was made in the context of a dispute 
about competing rights, I posit here that it reflects a continuing tension between rights 
and obligations in WTO law. That tension is emblematic of a deeper division within the 
treaty between opposing modes or “idea complexes” of law.23 On the one hand, the law 
is obligation-based and is collective, constitutional, dynamic and prospective in nature. 
Its logic is deductive and its chief value is equality. On the other, the law is rights-based 
and is individualized, contractual, static and retrospective in nature. Its logic is 
inductive and its chief value is fairness.  
 
The two idea complexes interact so that WTO law is ultimately both right and 
obligation based, and is a combination of all of the attributes I have just referred to. Its 
overarching logic is ‘abductive’ and its chief value is understanding.24 The law always 
tends towards the collective mode, but at times it will exhibit aspects of the second as it 
adjusts to real conditions. Over time the outcome results in a mental transformation, or 
what Philip Allott has referred to as a “revolution of the mind”.25 (see Fig. 1) 
 
The concepts presented here have much in common with constructivism, a school of 
international relations theory which regards law as the mutual construction of agent and 
structure. This distinguishes it from liberalism, which regards international relations as 
dictated by various forms of self-interest, or utilitarianism, which regards those 
identities as involving value maximization. Drawing on the work of Lon Fuller, 
constructivism maintains that actor identities, rather than self-interest, constitute the 
core of state behaviour, and that these identities are “shaped and reshaped by action 
within structures.”26 The “structures constrain social action, but they can also enable 
action, and in turn are altered by the friction of social action against the parameters of 
the structure.”27 In the case of the WTO Agreement the “social action” in question 
involves the interplay of rights and obligations within the “structure” of the treaty. 
 
I have chosen to on rights and obligations because they are often pivots of legal 
discourse and because pronouncements about them in WTO dispute settlement and 
elsewhere best illustrate the integrated set of ideas – or theory – put forward here. 
 
This article is arranged in four parts. Following the Introduction, Part Two deals with 
                                                 
22 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R para. 159 (12 Oct. 1998) [hereinafter 
Shrimp]. 
23 Allott, Health, above note 18 at 47. 
24 “…. [a]bductive logic seeks the best explanation … in response to novel or interesting data that doesn’t fit an extant model. 
Deductive or inductive logic might prove such a model true or untrue over time, but in the interim, abductive logic generates the best 
explanation of the data.” Roger Martin, The Opposable Mind (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) at 146. 
25 This observation is consistent with Philip Allott’s insistence on the ability of international legal arrangements to transform the way 
people think. “The history of human societies contains many examples of revolutionary change not only in real constitutions of 
societies but also in their ideal self-constituting, revolutions of the mind.” Allott, Health, above note 18 at 81 (emphasis added). 
26 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (2000) 19 at 30. 
27 Ibid. 
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the nature of theory and what can be expected from a theory of WTO law. Part Three 
sets out the theory, emphasizing the contrasting yet complementary roles that rights and 
obligations play together in the WTO’s legal order. The aim is not to identify any single 
relationship as much as it is to uncover the range of potential relationships between 
them. Part Four offers some concluding thoughts about a theory of WTO law. 
 
II. WHY A THEORY? 
 
The task of identifying a theory of WTO law naturally raises the issue of what a theory 
is and how it differs from other concepts about law. A theory has been defined as “a 
system of ideas”28 and to the extent that this article presents a system of ideas about 
WTO law, then we have a theory, or at least the beginnings of one. 
 
Still, a theory of WTO law naturally raises the question of why we need a theory at all? 
Considered carefully, at least five reasons for a theory come to mind.  
 
The first is descriptive. A theory of WTO law allows us to fit the various parts of the 
treaty together in terms of commonly accepted jurisprudential categories. What is 
observed in WTO law can therefore be understood as more than simply a reflection of 
political and economic priorities. It can be confirmed as part of a greater legal tradition.  
 
The second reason is analytic. A theory of WTO law allows us to systematically 
identify what the key elements of the law are and how they interact. The result is a new 
understanding of its coherence and unity. This knowledge can assist with the larger 
project of assembling a theory of law.  
 
The third reason is teleologic. With a theory of WTO law, we will have a better idea of 
what ends the law serves and how these depart from or cohere with law as a social 
phenomenon. In this sense, a theory of WTO law offers the possibility of progressing 
“from the study of laws to the study of law.”29  
 
The fourth reason is normative. For virtually the whole of its short history the WTO 
Agreement has been the subject of intense criticism, particularly from those who claim 
that it is unjust.30 To the extent that a theory affords us a better idea of what the law is 
and how this is linked to justice, the theory allows us to envisage what the law should 
be.  
 
A fifth reason for a theory of WTO law is explanatory, that is, the failure of other 
theories to adequately explain all that we see happening in WTO law. Here I refer to 
                                                 
28 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD DICTIONARY 3274 (4th ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
29 Ian McLeod, Legal Theory (3rd ed.) (2005) at 2. See also Allott, Health, above note 18 at 24.  
30 For example, the WTO is described as “a ‘medieval institution’ more akin to the Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages than a 
modern legal institution. Decisions remain largely within the control of a small number of powerful Western states, and … only states 
with access to the informal talks … have a strong influence on outcomes.” Deborah Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade 
Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy and Community (2005) at 14; “Good international rules do not create automatic benefits for 
human development, but they can facilitate policies that are good for the poor. Conversely, bad rules can outlaw such policies. Many 
of the rules enshrined in the WTO fall into the latter category. They threaten to marginalize developing countries and the world’s 
poorest people within an already unequal global trading system.” Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalization, 
and the Fight against Poverty (2002) at 207.  
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provisions like DSU Art. 3.8, which presumes nullification or impairment while other 
provisions appear to require strict proof.31 Or to occasional references in WTO dispute 
settlement to the protection of “expectations” while allowing for their disappointment 
in selected instances.32 Or to more subtle legal phenomena, like prospectivity and 
retrospectivity, or dynamism and statis.33 These differences are not accounted for by 
other theories but are undeniably there. They appear to be evidence of a deeper 
conceptual divide, a divide which bears thinking about if we wish to understand the 
treaty as a whole.34 
 
I would hasten to add, however, that what I am putting forward here is referred to as “a 
theory”, not “the theory”, in order to make clear that what I have to say is not meant to 
pre-empt other conceptions of what WTO law might be. The term “theory” has a 
forbidding and clinical aspect to it and may be interpreted by some as preclusive, a 
view I do not hold. The theory also has problems which need to be frankly addressed. It 
is not a perfect prediction of all that happens in WTO law, but I hope it can help to 
supplement and bring together what we already know. 
 
Many commentators appear to make sense of the prevailing situation by describing the 
WTO Agreement as either a “contract” or a “constitution”. Perhaps the most 
authoritative reference to contractualism is the Appellate Body’s statement in Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages35that: 
                                                 
31 DSU Art. 3(8) states that “[i]n cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the 
action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment.” The presumption has never been successfully 
rebutted. At the same time other provisions, like Safeguards Agreement Art. 6 (provisional safeguard possible “in critical 
circumstances” and pursuant to a preliminary determination based on “clear evidence”), Subsidies Agreement Art. 17.1(b) (provisional 
measures possible where preliminary affirmative determination that “subsidy exists and that there is injury to a domestic industry”) 
and Antidumping Agreement Art. 7.1(ii) (provisional measures possible where preliminary affirmative determination of “dumping and 
consequent injury to a domestic industry”). See also the standard for threatened injury: SAF Art. 4.2(a), SCM Arts. 15.7-8; AD Art. 
3.7. The level of evidence required was discussed in U.S. – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat 
from New Zealand and Australia, WT/DS177, 178/AB/R (May 1, 2001) at  para. 125 (where in interpreting the phrase “threat of 
serious injury” the Appellate Body emphasized the phrase “clearly imminent” which it considered to mean “that there must be a high 
degree of likelihood that the anticipated serious injury will materialize in the very near future.”). 
32 For some WTO dispute settlement reports referring to the protection of expectations see India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical 
and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (5 Sept. 1997) at para. 45; EC – Customs Classification of Certain Computer 
Equipment, WT/DS62/AB/R (5 June 1998) at paras. 82-84; Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R (18 Jan. 1999); Korea 
– Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS163/R (1 May 2000) at para. 7.75; U.S. – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (10 Nov. 2004) at para. 6.93; EC – Customs Classification on Frozen Boneless 
Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269, 286/AB/R (12 Sept. 2005) at para. 250; . 
33 As noted below, the idea of a system of law based in the first place on unknowable expectations is fundamentally prospective in 
perspective. It implicitly looks to the future. Because it is prospective, it is also dynamic and ever-changing. See for instance the 
discussion of the term “directly competitive and substitutable” in Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ibid. at para. 114 where the 
Appellate Body declined “to take a static view of the term”. At the same time, there is a secondary order of law at work in the WTO 
Agreement. This is primarily retrospective and is composed of attempts to re-create the past at one point in time, and is hence static. 
See for instance U.S. – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R (24 July 2001) at 
para. 192 where the Appellate Body discussed the term “positive evidence” in ADA Art. 3.1 and observed that “[t]he word “positive” 
means, to us, that the evidence must be of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be credible.”  
34 The theory put forward here also means to challenge the dominant optic on WTO law. As mentioned, the WTO Agreement was 
concluded in April 1994 and shortly thereafter its automatic system of dispute settlement began issuing decisions. Suddenly w e 
had something that looked familiar and court-like, and it was probably inevitable that we would come to understand the WTO 
Agreement as a body of law primarily in terms of adjudication. Consequently, much time and intellectual energy have been spent 
on the outcome of this or that case, on the trend in a series of cases, the burden of proof and so forth. The great bulk of this effort 
has undoubtedly been worthwhile. It has helped us to appreciate the treaty, and in some sense, to make it our own. At the sam e 
time, the fragmented way in which individual cases deal with the law has tended to obscure critical questions that come to mind 
only when looking at the law as a whole. The most important of these is why WTO law looks as it does? What accounts for both 
dispute settlement and negotiation? How can they be understood together? In other words, the dominant view has tended to stress 
the adversarial and corrective aspects of the treaty at the expense of constructive and facilitative ones which, I will suggest, is a 
more accurate conception of what is happening. 
35 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R at p. 14 (4 Oct. 1996) [emphasis added]. 
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The WTO Agreement is a treaty -- the international equivalent of a 
contract. It is self-evident that in an exercise of their sovereignty, and in 
pursuit of their own respective national interests, the Members of the 
WTO have made a bargain. In exchange for the benefits they expect to 
derive as Members of the WTO, they have agreed to exercise their 
sovereignty according to the commitments they have made in the WTO 
Agreement.36  
 
The Appellate Body’s statement emphasizes the minimal nature of the treaty's 
engagement. The WTO Agreement is a “contract” and sovereignty is limited “according 
to the commitments” countries have made. Not surprisingly, WTO member countries 
have found this conception of the treaty attractive and have referred to it on a number 
of occasions.37 Accordingly, WTO obligations are bilateral and conditional. 
 
A second theoretical perspective sees the treaty as constitutional. For instance, John 
Jackson has referred to the WTO Agreement as a “constitution” and Gail Evans has 
gone on to hypothesize that “the WTO may be explained as a trade constitution having 
the capacity to provide for the universalization of norms of substantive law.”38 
Accordingly, obligations are more collective in nature, and thus more uniform and 
absolute. 
 
A few commentators have gone on to speculate about the WTO Agreement as a 
“constitutional contract”, that is, an amalgam of the preceding two classifications, but 
they have not supplied much detail concerning this combination.39 This is behind my 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 See statement by Brazil in WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 15 (describing the WTO Agreement as “an international treaty laying down 
contractual obligations and not erga omnes obligations.”); Argentina in WT/DSB/M/42, pp. 14 (referring to SPS obligations as 
“contractual international obligations”). The contractual optic was also evident in The Future of the WTO: Addressing 
Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) [the Sutherland Report]. See for instance “contractual requirements of 
membership” (para. 3), “the contractual detail of the WTO” (para. 200), “an institution founded on negotiated contractual 
commitments among governments” (para. 206), “countries should have contractual entitlement to capacity building support” 
(para. 306), “the WTO, in future, should contain provisions for a contractual right” (para. 311). For commentators supportive of 
this view see Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in 
Nature?, 14:5 E.J.I.L. 907 (2003) p. 938 (“Put differently, the values, aspirations and priorities of close to 150 WTO Members 
remain far too diverse for WTO norms to be streamlined into constitutional-type obligations …”). Similarly, Petros Mavroidis has 
referred to the WTO Agreement as an “incomplete contract”. See Petros Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: 
A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). The compensatory orientation of contract law has been extended by the 
notion of “efficient breach”. For an application of this idea in the trade context see Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, “The 
Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization”, 31 J. Legal Stud. S179 (2002) 
(arguing that the concept of efficient breach is a “central feature” of WTO dispute settlement). 
38 See John Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence (1998); Gail Evans, Lawmaking under the Trade 
Constitution (1999) 44; Deborah Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy and 
Community (2005). Also Peter Gerhart, “Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Organization”, 24 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 
(2003) 1. For a critical appraisal of the constitutional view see Jeffrey Dunoff, “Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s Constitution and 
the Discipline of International Law”, 17:3 E.J.I.L. (2006) 647. Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis have asserted that while it is 
possible to articulate “the challenge of global economic governance in constitutional terms” the real challenge is that “the legitimacy 
of the multilateral trading order requires greater democratic contestability.” See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Enhancing 
WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?” in Marco Verweij and Tim Josling (eds.), 16:1 Governance 73 
(2003). 
39 This is the understanding of the WTO Agreement by several GATT Contracting Parties. See Xu Yu-Chong and Patrick Weller, The 
Governance of World Trade: International Civil Servants and the GATT/WTO (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004) at 67-68. The term 
has also been used in international environmental law: Catherine Redgwell, “Multilateral Environmental Treaty-Making” in Vera 
Gowland-Debbas (ed.), Multilateral Treaty Making: The Current Status of Challenges and Reforms Needed in the International 
Legislative Process (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 2000) 81 at 91. 
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insistence to go beneath convenient rubrics like ‘contract’ or ‘constitution’ and to do the 
hard work of examining rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement. It is rights 
and obligations that set out the parties’ binding commitments under the treaty, and it is 
likewise rights and obligations that serve as the basis for the treaty’s theory.  
 
I go on to suggest, however, that a purely dyadic conception of WTO law inherent in 
rights and obligations is incomplete. This is because over time we have to see these 
instruments working together, creating something that is, in effect, triadic. The law 
itself is composed of many additional elements – good faith and the like - that must be 
applied in order to achieve justice.40 Once all of this is understood, we will have a 
preliminary conception of what WTO law is about. 
 
Generally speaking, we might assume that the WTO Agreement and therefore WTO law 
are about trade. After all, the origins of the WTO Agreement lie in GATT, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947, which was later reformulated and expanded to 
become the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, now part of the WTO 
Agreement. But as I will explain, the principal concern of the treaty is with something 
much more extensive than trade alone. 
 
At base, the point I seek to make emphasizes a difference in regulatory perspective. The 
treaty's obligations do not operate directly to require specific quantities of trade as 
much as indirectly to maintain conditions that promote trade.41 This changes the optic. 
To say that the treaty is about “trade” is to adopt a frame of reference in the here and 
the now. It is to conceive of the treaty's chief purpose as being to protect individual 
transactions taking place in the present, or perhaps more accurately, in the immediate 
past, since trade cannot be accurately quantified unless it has already been conducted.42 
On the other hand, to say that the treaty protects expectations concerning trade-related 
behaviour comes at matters a little more generally. It abstracts them and renders them 
timeless. The treaty is no longer about trade per se. Rather, it is about trade and all that 
trade depends upon, including, most vitally, the freedom to trade.43 
 
This point was confirmed by the panel in United States – Section 301.44 The issue there 
was the consistency of certain U.S. trade remedy legislation with the WTO Agreement. 
The complaint asserted that s. 304 of the U.S. Trade Act required the U.S. Trade 
Representative to determine whether another WTO member denied U.S. rights under 
the WTO Agreement irrespective of dispute settlement timelines. The panel disagreed 
and decided instead that the Trade Representative had the discretion to make such a 
determination. However, the panel went on to examine whether there remained a risk to 
private economic operators that the U.S. would invoke its discretionary law in a WTO-
                                                 
40 This point was originally made by Edmund Burke, who recognized that rights and their jural correlatives, obligations, must be 
appreciated in the greater context of the legal and social environment in which they operate: William A. Edmundson, An Introduction 
to Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 43. See also Allott, Eunomia, above note 13 at 158ff.  
41 “It may, thus, be convenient in the GATT/WTO legal order to speak not of the principle of direct effect but of the principle of 
indirect effect.” United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (22 Dec. 1999) at para. 7.78. 
42 Alexander Keck and Alexander Raubold, “Forecasting Trade”, WTO Working Paper ERSD-2006-05 (May 2006). 
43 “The purpose of many [GATT/WTO] disciplines, indeed one of the primary objects of the GATT/WTO as a whole, is to produce 
certain market conditions which would allow this individual activity to flourish.” United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 
1974, WT/DS152/R (22 Dec. 1999) at para. 7.73. 
44 Ibid. 
 11 
inconsistent manner. The panel concluded that while there was such a risk, it was not a 
real one due to official assurances that the U.S. would never do so.45 The decision 
emphasizes how the security and predictability afforded under the treaty are a vital part 
of its greater purpose, and how they together contribute to what is referred to in the 
preamble of the U.N. Charter as “life in larger freedom”.46 
 
Nevertheless, the danger of founding a theory of law on an abstract concept such as the 
freedom to trade is potential confusion. Trade and the freedom to trade are closely 
related ideas, and when mixed up with the parade of ongoing events in the WTO, they 
make it hard to identify a theory of WTO law. We have to think deeply and carefully.  
 
In this respect what I present in this article can be thought of as a meta theory, from the 
Greek meta, or afterwards, meaning that which is of a more fundamental character and 
which subsists after all is said and done. Such a theory requires us to conceive of 
matters broadly. We have to assess many things, keeping one eye on the particular and 
the other eye on the general, and needless to say, that is hard to do. At some point we 
must go beyond positive law. The real value of the exercise is not the ability to 
determine what this or that case says, but to look at the whole of the treaty and discern 
its “overall scheme”.47 
 
III. A THEORY OF WTO LAW 
 
A theory is a “system of ideas”, and so in order to identify a theory of WTO law, we 
have to identify its principal ideas.     
 
A. Protecting Expectations: A Law of Obligations 
 
The starting point of a theory of WTO law is the realization that the principal aim of the 
WTO Agreement is the protection of expectations. An example is a concession by the 
United States to grant a certain tariff on textiles. The tariff is not about textile imports 
today. Rather, it is a promise by the U.S. government to treat textile imports in a certain 
way in the future. That promise gives security to textile producers and exporters in 
foreign countries that their goods will encounter a predictable kind of treatment when 
entering the U.S. In effect, the tariff serves as a basis for upstream decisions about 
investment, production and exports.48 They may decide to invest in certain machinery, 
or use certain inputs, or locate their manufacturing in certain countries. Whatever the 
outcome, many decisions will turn on the expectations created by the U.S. tariff.  
 
As to whom these expectations belong, it might be thought that expectations arising 
from WTO concessions or commitments are the “property” of the country or countries 
                                                 
45 “Accordingly, we find these statements by the U.S. express the unambiguous and official position of the U.S. representing, in  a 
manner that can be relied upon by all Members, an undertaking that the discretion of the USTR has been limited so as to prevent a 
determination of inconsistency before exhaustion of DSU proceedings.” Ibid. at para. 7.125. 
46 The preamble of the U.N. Charter states “We the peoples of the United Nations determined … to promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom …”. 
47 “The greater our knowledge, the more obscure the overall scheme.” Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (1962) at 89. 
48 Warrick Smith and Mary Hallward-Driemeier, “Understanding the Investment Climate”, Finance & Development (March 2005) at 
40. 
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that actually negotiate them. After all, those countries would be the ones most directly 
involved in the negotiations and would be the most likely to benefit. But as I will 
demonstrate, that is not at all the way in which expectations have been interpreted 
under the WTO Agreement. By virtue of the fact that the promises made under the 
treaty give rise to complex interactions that cannot be neatly disaggregated, it becomes 
effectively impossible to sort out whose expectations arise from the operation of the 
treaty or who should be compensated when they are breached. Bilaterally negotiated 
obligations thus become multilateral and absolute in application.49 
 
In India – Patent Protection50, for example, a WTO panel concluded that the legitimate 
expectations of each of India’s trading partners could be taken into account in 
interpreting India’s compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. However, this position was 
later overruled by the Appellate Body which held that “[t]he legitimate expectations of 
the parties to a treaty are reflected in the language of the treaty itself.”51 In EC – 
Computer Equipment the Appellate Body went on to suggest that the assessment of 
expectations had to be conducted with the collective membership of the WTO in 
mind.52 
 
The great collectivizing mechanism is the General Most-Favoured-Nation Clause 
(MFN) of GATT Art. I:1, which states: 
 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the 
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with 
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with 
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 
and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted 
by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any 
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the 
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties. 
 
The wording of the MFN clause makes clear that the obligations owed by one WTO 
member country to another “immediately and unconditionally” become obligations 
owed to all WTO countries. 
 
Such a configuration has important consequences. To start with, it tends to stress 
obligation. The idea of a generalized obligation is something encountered in a number 
of legal traditions, most notably in the Hindu notion of dharma.53 Likewise in WTO 
                                                 
49 “… most tariff concessions are negotiated bilaterally, but the results of the negotiations are extended on a multilateral basis.” 
European Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R (13 July 1998) at para. 94. 
50 WT/DS50/R (5 Sept. 1997). 
51 WT/DS50/AB/R (19 Dec. 1997) at para. 45. 
52 EC – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/AB/R (5 June 1998) at para. 109; for application in the 
context of GATS see U.S. – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (7 Apr. 
2005) at paras. 159-160. 
53 Dharma is difficult to define, but it has always been closely associated with the idea of duty. In traditional Hindu society individuals 
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law, the sense of duty upon member countries in the treaty system is all-pervasive. The 
law is more likely to be perceived as a body of obligations than as a balance of rights 
and obligations.  
 
A second point is that the generality of obligations influences the kind of justice 
available. Under the DSU countries have the right to take each other before panels where 
they assert that a national law violates the WTO Agreement. If a WTO panel or the 
Appellate Body agrees with the claim, a recommendation can be made that the defendant 
bring its laws “into conformity” with the treaty. There is no automatic requirement of 
compensation. Instead, the defendant is left to modify its law, in many cases by 
withdrawal or amendment of the impugned measure.  
 
The traditional explanation for this structure has been one of diplomatic convenience. It 
would be too difficult to sort out which countries have been harmed by the impugned 
measure, and a bare direction to bring the law “into conformity” allows the defendant 
some leeway in adjusting the law as it sees fit.54 
 
The theory of WTO law put forward here regards matters differently. It recognizes that 
the system’s principal concern is not with individual expectations per se, but rather with 
how collective expectations are distributed among the WTO membership as a whole. 
The prevailing model is therefore one of distributive justice.55 Distributive justice 
works to re-establish the arrangement of expectations according to the applicable metric 
of distribution, which in the case of the WTO Agreement is the equality mandated by 
MFN. When this can be done consensually, then the system is taken to work justly.56 
 
An interesting aspect of the law’s operation in this mode is its logic. Traditionally, 
GATT and WTO law have functioned according to deductive logic, or the ‘logic of 
what must be’, based on presumptions about what is likely to happen. Thus, DSU Art. 
3.8 states the presumption that a breach of WTO rules causes nullification or 
impairment. This gets at the fact that it is difficult to know with certainty what is 
                                                                                                                                                 
possess a dharma, or duty, and are charged with upholding it for the greater good of society. All of life is thus suffused with 
obligation: to one’s kin, to one’s associates, and to the wider forces of the cosmos. See H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 262ff. 
54 The idea is that it would be too difficult to disaggregate protective or discriminatory trade effects from other effects in the 
international trading system, a system which is by definition always changing: see United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain 
Imported Substances, B.I.S.D. 34th Supp. 136, para. 5.1.9 (adopted June 17, 1987). See also Robert Hudec, The GATT Legal System 
and World Trade Diplomacy 30 (Salem: Butterworths Legal Publishers, 1990) (discussing the evolution of GATT dispute settlement 
from “techniques of the diplomat’s jurisprudence”). 
55 The nature of justice was considered two millennia ago by Aristotle, who identified two types of justice: corrective and distributive. 
Corrective justice applies to private interests and plays a rectificatory role in transactions. Thus, when a person is wrongly deprived of 
their property they are entitled to have it returned or to be compensated. The implicit metric is equality: you get what you’ve lost. 
Distributive justice, by comparison, applies to the distribution of public interests such as “honour or money or other things that have to 
be shared among members of the political community.” It presupposes some socially agreed means of allotment. Consequently, the 
implicit metric is proportionate: you get what you’re entitled to. See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (R. Crisp ed.) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 85. See also Nicholas Rescher, Fairness: The Theory and Practice of Distributive Justice (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002). 
56 This is undoubtedly behind the stated preference in DSU Art. 3.7 for “a solution that is mutually acceptable to the parties … and 
consistent with the covered agreements.” It is further reinforced by the statement in Art. 3.7 that “the aim of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute.” What “positive” means in the context is unclear, but its traditional connotation 
as something affirmative suggests that the outcome is not only “mutually acceptable to the parties” in the manner of a win-win 
solution, but also that it “develop[s] and strengthen[s] relationships among those involved.” Note also the wording of DSU Art. 3.5, 
which specifies that all solutions to matters raised in dispute settlement are not to “nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member”, 
thereby emphasizing the idea that solutions must be broadly acceptable and beneficial to the entire WTO membership. 
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actually happening. Instead, the law is based on what is assumed to occur rather than 
any careful inquiry into what actually occurs. 
 
B. Facilitating Adjustment: A Law of Rights 
 
I have described WTO law as a law of obligations, something which is accurate as a 
preliminary description. This is because countries assume obligations towards other 
countries under the treaty, and these are extended to all other WTO members by virtue 
of MFN. 
 
Still, if we examine the treaty closely, it is also possible to identify something else 
happening. Rules exist under the WTO Agreement that allow governments to respond 
to certain realities arising in the course of trade. By realities I mean the world as it is 
actually encountered versus the way it is prospectively expected or perceived. The law 
in this mode is more evidently a regime of rights. 
 
This point was made by the panel in Turkey – Textiles, where the issue was whether 
Turkey had the right to adopt certain import restrictions on textiles and clothing prior to 
entering into a customs union with the EC. Turkey's argument was that it could adopt 
the EC's restrictions without the need for renegotiation with third countries because the 
restrictions were already part of the EC's WTO commitment. The panel observed: 
 
The WTO system of rights and obligations provides, in certain instances, 
flexibility to meet the specific circumstances of Members. For instance, 
the ATC has grand-fathered certain MFA derived rights regarding import 
restrictions for specific Members and Articles XII, XIX, XX and XXI of 
GATT authorize Members, in specific situations, to make use of special 
trade measures. We consider that, even if the formation of a customs 
union may be the occasion for the constituent member(s) to adopt, to the 
greatest extent possible, similar policies, the specific circumstances 
which serve as the legal basis for one Member's exercise of such a 
specific right cannot suddenly be considered to exist for the other 
constituent members.57 
 
The panel's comments suggest an important distinction in the law. This is that WTO law 
as a law of rights is much less cohesive than WTO law as a law of obligations. A reality 
for one country will not be the same reality for every other country.58 Consequently, 
WTO law in this second mode is made up of a range of apparently unconnected rights 
arising in different circumstances. Their variability makes them more difficult to discern. 
 
Rights under the WTO Agreement are further diminished by their conditionality. The 
                                                 
57 Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R (31 May 1999) at para. 9.184 [emphasis added].  
58 This tension was at the heart of EC – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R 
(7 April 2004) where the Appellate Body had to distinguish between treatment of developing countries as a group and their treatment 
as members of sub-groups or individually. The Appellate Body observed at para. 169 that: “[W]e are of the view that the objective of 
improving developing countries’ “share in the growth in international trade”, and their “trade and export earnings”, can be fulfilled by 
promoting preferential policies aimed at those interests that developing countries have in common, as well as those interests shared by 
sub-categories of developing countries based on their particular needs.” [emphasis in original]. 
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right might be the right of a country to take anti-dumping or countervailing duty action. 
Most often the issue in dispute settlement is whether the conditions precedent to an 
exercise of that right - such as a properly conducted investigation - have been fulfilled. 
 
These aspects of the law were highlighted in Argentina – Footwear Safeguard.59 In that 
case the issue was whether Argentina had met requirements to impose safeguards on 
imports of footwear from the EC. The Appellate Body observed: 
 
… it must always be remembered that safeguard measures result in the 
temporary suspension of concessions or withdrawal of obligations, such 
as those in Article II and Article XI of the GATT 1994, which are 
fundamental to the WTO Agreement. As such, safeguard measures may 
be applied only when all the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards 
and Article XIX of the GATT 1994 are clearly demonstrated.60 
  
The Appellate Body's comments in Argentina – Footwear Safeguard also demonstrate 
another feature of reality-based disciplines: the insistence on a “clear showing”.61 This 
differs markedly from the presumption of nullification or impairment observed in the 
law of expectations.62 The logic in this mode is inductive, or the ‘logic of what is’, 
based on empiric evidence. This is particularly true where the right is exercised 
provisionally or anticipatorily.63 The exact requirements to satisfy such a need for 
evidence will vary according to the discipline involved and the particular circumstances 
of each case.64 
                                                 
59 Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (14 Dec. 1999). 
60 Ibid. (Dec. 14, 1999) at para. 95.  
61 See for example Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R (10 Jan. 2001) at para. 
162-164 (“determination of whether a measure determination of whether a measure, which is not ‘indispensable’, may nevertheless be 
‘necessary’ within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors 
which prominently include the contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the 
importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or 
regulation on imports or exports.”). Evidentiary obligations can also be found in ADA Arts. 3.4 (impact examination to include an 
evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices”), 3.5 (causal relationship determination “shall be based on an examination of 
all relevant evidence before the authority”), Annex II (determinations permissible on the basis of facts available), 5.3, 5.8 and 6 
(accuracy and adequacy of evidence, and opportunity to present), 10.7 (sufficiency of evidence) and 11.2 (evidence required for 
revocation). For various instances of application see U.S. – Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, B.I.S.D. 
40th Supp. 358 (27-28 October 1993) at para. 332; U.S. – Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors 
(DRAM) of One Megabit or Above from Korea, WT/DS99/R (29 Jan. 1999) at para. 6.43; Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation on 
Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/R (28 Jan. 2000) at para. 7.97; Guatemala – Anti-
Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/R (19 June 1998) at para. 7.77; U.S. – Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS 184/R (28 Feb. 2001) at para. 7.153; see also application of SCM 
Arts. 4.2, 11 and 12, CVA Art. 8.3, and Annex 1; SPS Art. 3.3 (scientific justification) and EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26,48/AB/R (16 Jan. 1998) at para. 184; PSA Art. 2.2 (evidentiary standards for price verifications); 
DSU Art. 26.1 (detailed justification in support of non-violation claims). 
62 See DSU Art. 3.8 (“In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is 
considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment.”) 
63 See for example Safeguards Agreement Art. 6 (provisional safeguard possible “in critical circumstances” and pursuant to a 
preliminary determination based on “clear evidence”), Subsidies Agreement Art. 17.1(b) (provisional measures possible where 
preliminary affirmative determination that “subsidy exists and that there is injury to a domestic industry”) and Antidumping 
Agreement Art. 7.1(ii) (provisional measures possible where preliminary affirmative determination of “dumping and consequent 
injury to a domestic industry”). See also the standard for threatened injury: SAF Art. 4.2(a), SCM Arts. 15.7-8; AD Art. 3.7. In this 
respect see also U.S. – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, 
WT/DS177,178/AB/R (1 May 2001) at para. 125 (where in interpreting the phrase “threat of serious injury” the Appellate Body 
emphasized the phrase “clearly imminent” which it considered to mean “that there must be a high degree of likelihood that the 
anticipated serious injury will materialize in the very near future.”). 
64 This has led to concern about fact-finding ability in WTO dispute settlement. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, “WTO 
Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views from the Perspective of the Appellate Body’s Experience”, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 
1505 at 1542 (2003) (observing that “[d]espite the extensive right to seek information of every panel, it is generally believed that the 
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The requirement of evidence is linked to the law’s aspect in this mode as contractual 
and justice’s aspect as corrective, that is, as seeking to repair harm done. We can easily 
see how the exercise of a right by one country could give rise to a claim for reparation 
from another country, a possibility contemplated in the remedy of negotiated 
compensation under DSU Art. 22.2.65 It is also easy to see how the underlying ethos of 
the law is justice-as-fairness, that is, the system seeks to repair to the extent appropriate 
in the circumstances. This is not necessarily equal to the harm done.66  
 
A further feature serving to limit rights under the WTO Agreement is their mutuality. 
WTO law as a law of rights cannot be exercised in such a way as to eviscerate the rights 
of other WTO members, a doctrine known as abuse of rights (abus de droit).67 This 
point was emphasized in U.S. – Shrimp where the issue was the right of the U.S. to 
invoke the exception in GATT Art. XX(g) involving conservation measures.68 The U.S. 
raised the exception as a defence to its violation of GATT Art. XI:1, the prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions, since the U.S. legislation in question effectively prohibited the 
importation of shrimp that was not caught in a “turtle-friendly” manner. 
 
The Appellate Body agreed that the U.S. had met the terms of the exception, but then 
went on to analyze whether it had fulfilled the conditions of the preamble, or 
“chapeau”, of Art. XX.69 In doing so the Appellate Body observed: 
 
Exercise by one Member of its right to invoke an exception, such as 
Article XX(g), if abused or misused, will, to that extent, erode or render 
naught the substantive treaty rights in, for example, Article XI:1, of other 
Members. Similarly, because the GATT 1994 itself makes available the 
exceptions of Article XX, in recognition of the legitimate nature of the 
policies and interests there embodied, the right to invoke one of those 
exceptions is not to be rendered illusory. The same concept may be 
expressed from a slightly different angle of vision, thus, a balance must 
be struck between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under 
                                                                                                                                                 
investigation of facts is among the weakest spots of the panel procedure.”). Petros Mavroidis, “Essay: Dispute Settlement Procedures 
and Mechanisms”, 16 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 225 at 258 (1999) (“The WTO has been criticized … for its fact-finding defects … ”). 
65 “If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance … such 
Member shall, if so requested, and no later than the expiry of the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with any party 
having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation.”  
66 The possibility that GATT and WTO dispute settlement might offer less than the harm done was adverted to in United States –
Antidumping Duties on Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico, ADP/82 (9 July 1992) at para. 5.43 where the panel 
suggested that there could be situations where a corrective remedy would be onerous due to the passage of time and the difficulty of 
calculating reimbursement. It has also been implicit in several other instances of authorized retaliation under the WTO. In those cases 
recovery was permitted only to the extent determinable or where recovery would not impair the trading system. These recall outcomes 
experienced in Anglo-American contract law where the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the full value of their loss due to the greater 
social cost in making the plaintiff whole: Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962); Ruxley Electronics 
and Construction Limited v. Forsyth, [1996] A.C. 344 (H.L.). Consequently, fairness is a variable standard tailored to the 
circumstances. 
67 Reference to the doctrine can be found in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R at para. 152 (12 Oct. 1998). It is traditionally a doctrine of the civil law. Its application in international law is 
discussed in Ian Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility – Part I 52 (1983). 
68 U.S. – Shrimp, ibid. 
69 The preamble to GATT Art. XX provides that “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any contracting party of measures: … ”. 
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Article XX and the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights 
of the other Members. To permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right 
to invoke an exception would be effectively to allow that Member to 
degrade its own treaty obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights 
of other Members. If the abuse or misuse is sufficiently grave or 
extensive, the Member, in effect, reduces its treaty obligation to a merely 
facultative one and dissolves its juridical character, and, in so doing, 
negates altogether the treaty rights of other Members. The chapeau was 
installed at the head of the list of "General Exceptions" in Article XX to 
prevent such far-reaching consequences.70 
 
A similar observation was made in U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards, where the dispute 
involved the U.S.'s right to impose safeguards against imports of certain steel pipe from 
Korea. The Appellate Body observed: 
 
There is, therefore, a natural tension between, on the one hand, 
defining the appropriate and legitimate scope of the right to apply 
safeguard measures and, on the other hand, ensuring that safeguard 
measures are not applied against "fair trade" beyond what is necessary 
to provide extraordinary and temporary relief. A WTO Member seeking 
to apply a safeguard measure will argue, correctly, that the right to 
apply such measures must be respected in order to maintain the 
domestic momentum and motivation for ongoing trade liberalization. 
In turn, a WTO Member whose trade is affected by a safeguard 
measure will argue, correctly, that the application of such measures 
must be limited in order to maintain the multilateral integrity of 
ongoing trade concessions. The balance struck by the WTO Members 
in reconciling this natural tension relating to safeguard measures is 
found in the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards.71 
 
The Appellate Body's statements in U.S. – Shrimp and U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards 
illustrate the fact that the WTO Agreement as a law of rights involves action that is 
highly conditioned and contextualized, and that exists within a larger matrix of rights 
and obligations. 
 
C. Promoting Interdependence: A Regime of Lex Specialis 
 
The classification of WTO law into a law of obligations and a law of rights is attractive 
since it emphasizes both the WTO regime’s legality (i.e. as an order of rights and 
obligations) and unity (i.e. as a network of obligations countered by rights). At the same 
time, the theory’s coherence implies that there is something else arising from the 
interaction of its parts, something which only becomes apparent across time. This is the 
idea of WTO law as a regime of lex specialis. 
                                                 
70 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Oct. 12, 1998) para. 156 (emphasis in original). 
71 United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, 
WT/DS202/AB/R (15 Feb. 2002) at para. 83 (emphasis in original). 
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The term lex specialis has no fixed meaning in international law.72 We can take from its 
Latin roots, however, that it is a ‘special’ or ‘exceptional’ body of law distinct from the 
law that which is regularly applied. The extent of displacement is determined by the lex 
specialis.73 Some idea of the special character of this regime comes by comparing WTO 
obligations with those typically found in international law. 
 
The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility suggest that in 
the typical bilateral relationship rights are linked to corresponding obligations. Thus, 
ASR Art. 2(1) provides that a country’s wrongful act imposes upon it an obligation of 
state responsibility. ASR Art. 42(a) further specifies that this obligation is owed in the 
first place to the “injured state”, the injured state being defined as “the State whose 
individual right has been denied or impaired by the internationally wrongful act or 
which has otherwise been particularly affected by that act.”74 ASR Art. 42(b) goes on to 
specify that the obligation may be owed to the international community as a whole, or 
to a subset thereof, and Art. 48 contemplates that responsibility may be invoked by a 
state other than an injured state provided that the obligation is owed to a group of states 
and is established for the group’s collective interest, or is an obligation owed to the 
international community as a whole. 
 
The dominant impression left by ASR is therefore that obligations under international 
law are of two types: either bilateral or collective, not both. Yet if we look carefully at 
the WTO Agreement, it becomes clear that WTO obligations have a dual quality. To be 
sure, MFN operates to presumptively multilateralize all obligations under the treaty. 
Nevertheless, there remain significant bilateralizing tendencies that work to counter 
this. 
 
For instance, a purely collective arrangement would allow any country that is a member 
to contest a breach since the fundamental interest at stake belongs to all, yet the WTO 
Agreement does not do this. Instead, it requires individual countries to launch claims 
and only permits them to retaliate where they have actual trade with the defendant.75 
Likewise, countries invoking third party status in dispute settlement are required to 
show a “substantial interest”.76 More generally, the Appellate Body has made references 
to “countries concerned”, a phrase which suggests that there are issues of concern 
within the treaty that extend to some, but not necessarily all, WTO members.77  
 
This intermediate position can be understood by referring to the ASR and its 
                                                 
72 Instead, it is often transliterated directly as a “special law” to distinguish it from the more usual consequences of state responsibility. 
See Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 
A/CN.4/L.682 34 (13 April 2006). 
73 “It will depend on the special rule to establish the extent to which the more general rules on State responsibility … are displaced 
…”. James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries 307  
(2002) [hereinafter Crawford]. 
74 Crawford, ibid., 254. 
75 “… a [WTO] Member’s legal interest in compliance by other Members does not, in our view, automatically imply that it is entitled 
to obtain authorization to suspend concessions under Article 22 of the DSU.” EC Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas (Recourse to Arbitration under Art. 22.6), WT/DS27/ARB (April 9, 1999) at para. 6.10. 
76 Chi Carmody, “Of Substantial Interest: Third Parties under GATT”, 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 615 (1997). 
77 EC – Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/R (Mar. 7, 2003) at para. 7.125; United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) at para. 7.55. 
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accompanying Commentary. ASR Art. 33(1) provides that obligations “may be owed to 
another State, to several States, or to the international community as a whole, 
depending in particular on the character and content of the international obligation and 
on the circumstances of the breach.” The Commentary goes on to clarify that the scope 
of the obligation is dictated both by the nature of the primary rule and the situation 
encountered in its breach. Thus, it is entirely conceivable that WTO obligations might 
have a dual character and, strictly speaking, be neither wholly bilateral nor wholly 
collective, but rather some combination of the two. 
 
I take the view that hybridity or combination is a good way to think about WTO 
obligations: bilateral in some instances, multilateral in most others. Elsewhere I have 
suggested that such dualism may be evidence of WTO obligations as fundamentally 
interdependent, that is, conditioned on the observation by other countries of their 
obligations under the treaty. 
 
What does this peculiar regime of law amount to? The immediate overarching purpose 
of WTO law is the promotion of interdependence.78 That comes about as a result of the 
interaction of rights and obligations and is apparent in two respects: one is the way in 
which national bureaucracies function, the other is the way in which economic 
operators think.79 In both instances, the treaty creates a new situation. 
 
A “new situation” is a catchall phrase employed in law to denote a shift in thinking. The 
shift occurs because national bureaucrats are more likely to take account of 
international law and to consult, or at least to advert to, international standards, while 
economic operators are more likely to look for trading partners that offer the most 
attractive terms regardless of nationality. In both cases, bureaucrats and economic 
operators are more likely to know, or at least rely upon, the rights and obligations of 
foreign governments. The result is greater interdependence. 
 
The type of logic at work here is abductive logic, or the ‘logic of what might be’. This 
demands neither presumptions nor proof in all instances. Instead, the law is based on 
what will occur in the future based on the transformative framework arrived at. 
 
One notable example of transformation is the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health. The Declaration was something arrived at gradually through efforts in many 
fora, but eventually took its final shape in a consensual pronouncement by the WTO 
membership in November 2001. Outwardly, the Declaration would appear to confirm 
an event-driven, interstitial view of the treaty, or in other words, a sort of “big bang” 
theory about the origins of WTO law. Reality, however, is different. 
 
Haochen Sun has done a masterful job of tracing the transformation at work in the 
                                                 
78 Donald McRae has written: “… international trade highlights the concept of interdependence. In fact, when we talk of 
international trade law and of international law we are dealing with two regimes, with two systems that in quite a fundamental 
way are talking about different things.” Donald M. McRae, The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development of 
International Law 260 Recueil des Cours 99, 117 (1996) [emphasis added]. 
79 This observation is consistent with Philip Allott’s insistence on the ability of international legal arrangements to transform the way 
people think. “The history of human societies contains many examples of revolutionary change not only in real constitutions of 
societies but also in their ideal self-constituting, revolutions of the mind.” Allott, Health, above note 18 at 81 (emphasis added). 
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drafting and adoption of the Declaration.80 He illustrates how a number of countries 
and non-governmental organizations were concerned about the hard-line approach to 
pharmaceutical patent protection in India – Patent Protection81 and how they sought to 
recast the issue of compulsory licencing as one of human rights by discussing it in the 
World Intellectual Property Organization, the Office of the U.N. High Commission for 
Human Rights, the U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights, the World Health 
Organization and its Assembly, and the U.N. General Assembly.82 These discussions 
had the desired effect. Each body adopted statements broadly supportive of a country’s 
right to compulsorily licence in order to protect public health. 
 
Sun also details how litigation launched by the branded pharmaceutical companies in 
South Africa in 1998 and by the United States against Brazil in the WTO in February 
2001 effectively backfired because it depicted the branded pharmaceutical companies 
as profit-driven and the global public in many developing countries as denied the right 
to human health.83 These perceptions were reinforced by the apparently self-interested 
behaviour of certain developed countries in response to an anthrax scare in the fall of 
2001.84 
 
The outcome of these events was a certain ripening of the compulsory licencing issue 
internationally. A new “balance” embodying the emerging global consensus about 
intellectual property protection was ready to be struck. The Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health of November 2001 achieved this by acknowledging that “intellectual 
property protection is important for the development of new medicines” and also 
confirming that “the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent [WTO] 
Members from taking measures to protect public health.”85 Proceeding from these 
principles, the Declaration recognized that the flexibility inherent in the TRIPS 
Agreement allows each member “the right to grant compulsory licences and the 
freedom to determine the grounds on which such licences are granted.” The 
Declaration likewise recognized that “[e]ach Member has the right to determine what 
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency”, 
specifically mentioning “those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics …”. 
 
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health was able to establish a framework 
for resolving many questions in a far more comprehensive manner than the typical 
result in WTO dispute settlement. It possessed the added advantage of being 
interpretative in nature and therefore not necessarily requiring immediate action on 
implementation. However, one issue that it did not resolve was identified in paragraph 6 
of the Doha Declaration: 
 
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing 
                                                 
80 Haochen Sun, “The Road to Doha and Beyond: Some Reflections on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health”, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 
(2004) 123 [hereinafter Sun]. 
81 India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (19 Dec. 1997). 
82 Sun, above note 79 (Feb. 2004) at 127-32. 
83 Ibid., 132-133. 
84 Ibid., 133-134. 
85 WTO Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (20 Nov. 2001). 
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capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making 
effective use of compulsory licences under the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
The Declaration therefore instructed “the [WTO] Council for TRIPS to find an 
expeditious solution to this problem and report to the General Council before the end of 
2002.” 
 
This statement provided impetus for negotiation and agreement on the Decision on the 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration in August 2003.86 The 
Decision solved the problem of exporting compulsorily licenced pharmaceuticals to 
countries with little pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity by waiving the requirement 
in TRIPS Art. 31(f) that “any such use shall be authorized predominately for the 
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use.”87 The Decision effectively 
allows – but does not require – countries to identify whether they will be eligible 
“importing Members”, that is, whether they will use the system established by the 
Decision to import compulsorily licenced pharmaceuticals, and in parallel, whether they 
wish to be designated as “exporting Members” to produce pharmaceuticals for export to 
eligible importing WTO members.88 
 
What is striking about both the Declaration and the Decision in light of the theory put 
forward above is the way in which they are documents about the arrangement of rights 
and obligations. Importing countries are obliged to notify the WTO TRIPS Council of 
the quantities of products needed, to confirm insufficient manufacturing capacity, and 
then proceed to grant compulsory licences. Exporting countries are likewise obliged to 
issue compulsory licences, to indicate how much product is being produced, to ensure 
distinctive packaging, and so forth. 
 
The obligations set out in the Decision - and the rights they infer - are fundamentally 
about the way in which countries will work together in future, a key feature of 
transformative justice. Transformative justice does not presume wrongdoing. Instead, it 
aims to resolve conflicts of interest through the exploration of options and the 
formulation of acceptable responses. A vital attribute of transformative justice is that it 
seeks to develop and strengthen relationships among those involved.89 In the case of the 
Decision this is further emphasized by overarching obligations of technical and 
financial cooperation to prevent the re-exportation of compulsorily licenced products, 
to develop systems of regional patents, and to “cooperate in paying special attention to 
the transfer of technology and capacity-building in the pharmaceutical sector.”90  
                                                 
86 Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (2 
Sept. 2003). 
87 The Decision also waives TRIPS Art. 31(h) which provides that in securing a compulsory licence for a patented product “the right 
holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the 
authorization.” 
88 The Decision was supplemented in December 2005 by a move to permanently incorporate the operative provisions of the Decision 
into the TRIPS in the form of a projected TRIPS ‘Art. 31bis’. The amendment requires ratification by two-thirds of the WTO 
membership, or approximately 100 countries. As of the deadline for doing so in December 2007 only 13 countries had ratified. In 
December 2007 the ratification deadline was postponed until 31 December 2009. See WT/L/711 (21 Dec. 2007). 
89 Law Commission of Canada, From Restorative Justice to Transformative Justice: Discussion Paper, Law Commission of Canada 
Catalogue No. JL2-6/1999 (1999). 
90 Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health , WT/L/540, 
Art. 7 (2 Sept. 2003). 
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The Decision is a useful example of what the interaction of rights and obligations under 
the WTO Agreement can achieve. At the same time, it is not problem-free. To recall the 
Appellate Body’s statement in U.S. – Shrimp, ““[t]he location of the line of equilibrium 
… is not fixed and unchanging.” This suggests that the balance struck in documents 
like the Decision is fluid and may, or may not, be broadly acceptable depending upon 
its ability to reflect the deeper moral sense of what is required. In the aftermath of the 
Decision, for instance, there continues to be skirmishing over compulsory licencing 
apparent in the way that countries have implemented the Decision and the small 




In this article I have put forward a theory of WTO law. It is a juridical theory, or in 
other words, a theory of law based on justice. The analysis involves identification of the 
fundamental elements of WTO law and seeks to answer the principal question of 
analytic jurisprudence: the question of what the law is. 
 
The development of a theory is facilitated by the close correspondence in WTO law 
between collective obligations and distributive justice on the one hand, and individual 
rights and corrective justice on the other. When observed together, the two idea 
complexes can be seen to operate reflexively in the manner of moieties. A “moiety” is a 
borrowing from the French term moitié, or half, and in its standard English meaning is 
used to suggest the greater whole that the half is a part of.92 
 
I offer these ideas not only as a means of thinking more clearly about the treaty as a 
whole, but also to explain phenomena that are observed in relation to WTO law. At a 
glance, few of them appear entirely rational: the bare requirement in dispute settlement 
to bring laws “into compliance”, the relatively liberal rules on third-party standing, the 
generality witnessed in so many instances, the particularity in others, the evidentiary 
presumptions versus the requirements of proof, the debate over the WTO Agreement as 
a “contract” versus as a “constitution”, and so forth. 
 
The identification of these two moieties – of rights and obligations, of “real” and 
“ideal” – at the heart of the treaty yields an important insight. So far we have struggled 
to understand it largely in terms of the debate between the treaty as a contract or as a 
constitution.  
 
In this article, however, I have posited that the two conceptions work jointly so that the 
WTO Agreement is in reality a hybrid. This hybridism is apparent at every level: 
juridically in the interplay between distributive and corrective justice and between and 
justice-as-equality and justice-as-fairness, substantively in the characterization of WTO 
obligations as either collective or bilateral, temporally in the gaze of the law to the 
                                                 
91 In July 2007 Rwanda made the first notification under the Paragraph 6 system when it notified the WTO about the importation of 
260,000 doses of TriAvir, a combination anti-retroviral, from Canada. See IP/N/RWA/1 (19 July 2007).  
92 “Moiety”, The Oxford English Dictionary, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 1809.  
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future and the past, and kinetically in the application of law to subject matter that is 
thought of as either dynamic or static. To be sure, the distributive, equality-based, 
prospective and dynamic aspect of the law takes priority, but this is matched in many 
instances by a secondary aspect that is corrective, fairness-based, retrospective and 
static, so that the two ultimately function together.   
 
Of course, to say all of this casts much of what is currently accepted about WTO law in 
question. The received account of WTO law is largely historical and suggests that what 
has arisen has been created by the will of states and findings of dispute settlement, so 
that the law is understood something willful and positive.93 Accordingly, it follows no 
independent ‘design’. 
 
For the reasons set out here, however, I disagree. This article has suggested that an 
underlying theory of WTO law is discernible, even if it does not always exhibit 
perfectly or systematically. The remaining hurdle to overcome is how we tend to view 
WTO law, which is textually, according to individual cases, so that conceptual 
coherence is often lost.  
 
It is also true that the theory put forward here is not something easily understood. As 
mentioned, a theory is a complex undertaking and is subject to many simplifying 
assumptions, in particular, that the principal purpose of WTO law is to protect 
expectations, that its subsidiary purpose is to adjust to realities, and that these two 
purposes interact to promote interdependence. The simplicity of this theoretical 
framework immediately raises many questions and leads to the frustrating tendency that 
“everything must be discussed at the same time.”94 
 
And even if all of the ideas I have put forward are accepted, it is still possible to say, in 
effect, so what? How does a theory of WTO law make any difference, or help us win 
cases? Here the answer is that a theory can help to make sense of what we see 
happening. It allows us to explain, to categorize, and from the resulting arrangement to 
make connections between the treaty's disparate features. Things fall into place. Order 
becomes apparent. 
 
Order is important because there is something very slight, almost surreal, about the 
WTO Agreement. Heavy reliance on expectations makes the treaty appear at times like 
an “emperor with no clothes.” That impression is reinforced by continuing examples of 
non-compliance, and by the stark fact that, at least in the short term, international trade 
has produced both winners and losers. All of this taken together makes it hard to escape 
the sense that we are being asked to believe in too much.95 
 
                                                 
93 See for instance Robert Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (London: Praeger, 1975) and Robert Hudec, 
Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System (Salem: Butterworths, 1993); John Jackson, 
World Trade and the Law of GATT (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); Kenneth Dam, The GATT; Law and International Economic 
Organization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970). 
94 Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour 1920-1937 585 (New York: Penguin, 1992). 
95 It may be that this thinking takes us to the edge of myth. Much work has been done by anthropologists on the role of myths in 
societies, and in particular, on the way in which they served to shape a collective consciousness. Karen Armstrong, A Short History of 
Myth (Toronto: Knopf, 2005). For a recent view of economics as a “faith” see Duncan K. Foley, Adam’s Fallacy: A Guide to Economic 
Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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Again, however, it is important to consider carefully what the treaty involves to see that 
its basic arrangement does make sense. The real issue is one of balance between the 
idea-complexes, or moieties. 
 
In saying this I do not want to be taken to be describing something perfect. The theory 
of WTO law conceives of the law's subjects – countries – as fixed in their relations with 
each other. All countries are formally equal, and all are bound together in a steadily 
growing web of interdependence. 
 
A critical eye will recognize, however, that the equality of MFN masks great inequality 
and that the interdependence fostered by WTO law can then, by virtue of structural 
flaws inherent in the pattern of international economic relations, be accused of 
consigning the majority of countries to their existing status and not some brighter 
future. Consequently, the theory I have posited here starts to look a lot less organic and 
acceptable and a lot more artificial and objectionable. The central question of normative 
jurisprudence - that is, what WTO law should be – suddenly, and very forcefully, 
reasserts itself.96 
 
Yet the issue of what law should be is complex and cannot be dealt with fully here. My 
aim in this article has been to set out a general theory of what WTO law is and to 
explore some of its details. That focus originates in dissatisfaction with the state of our 
current understanding and with the conviction that “the greater our knowledge, the 
more obscure the overall scheme.”97 One could be skeptical about the possibility of 
such a comprehensive explanation and its ability to solve existing problems, but if all 
that I have described is simply a coincidence, then it is doubtless a very great one. 
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96 “Nor can you rely on any embedded notion of equality to escape the role which the tradition accords you. If no one can create the 
tradition, no one can escape its teaching and the roles it defines, except by departure (and there may be no place to go). This represents 
a classic problem that no one, anywhere, has solved. How can a communal form of organization avoid disequilibrium, and inequality, 
of social role?” H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World 67-68 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
97 Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind 89 (1962). 
